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1. Introduction  
 
What makes a German national1 a citizen of Germany? Is it that she shares the German 
national culture or that she is part of the German political community? Is it her German 
blood? As the links between membership and territory are becoming less transparent, these 
questions have a renewed relevance. The internationalization of the market economy and 
looser restriction on immigration ease and encourage the mobility of people across 
boundaries. In turn, these social changes have affected perceptions on political membership 
and on the boundaries of the political community or demos, as well as they have produced 
new dynamics of belonging that transcend the traditional idea of the nation-state. Still, states 
retain the task of allocating political membership under the premise that they are sovereign, 
that is, they wield the ultimate right to decide who can be a citizen within their jurisdiction – 
who belongs (Carens 2013, p. 22). In the context of immigration, however, democratic states’ 
wide reliance on ius sanguinis laws (right by blood), ius soli laws (right by soil), or a mixture 
of both to distribute political membership often produces results that seem at odds with the 
very idea of democracy – rule by the people and for the people.  
 
The expansion of ius soli laws in some cases to include the children of immigrant residents, 
and the relaxation of naturalization rules in others, recognize that there is something troubling 
about the political exclusion of long-term immigrant residents in a state. On the other hand, 
these efforts have been far outweighed by those taken to include descendants of emigrants or 
a state’s expats iure sanguinis, regardless of their links to the political community (Dumbrava 
2015, p. 1). That means that someone might have political rights somewhere without ever 
having set foot there, or without even speaking the state’s language. What this shows is a 
continued reluctance to abandon the principle of ethnic membership altogether, as all states 
have, besides their other citizenship laws, some form of ius sanguinis (Joppke 2003, p. 443). 
Not surprisingly, some have argued that even today, citizenship practices conflate ethnos, i.e. 
ethnic nation, and demos (Habermas 1998, p. 33; Benhabib 2004, p. 61).  
 
In the philosophical debate that has ensued from what Baubock (2009) calls “the mismatch 
between territorial and membership boundaries” most theorists agree that the demos neither is 
nor should be ethnically constituted. However, they disagree on how or if it should be 
                                                 
1 Here I use national as citizen 
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bounded. Liberal nationalists argue that the demos is bounded by a pre-political nation, that 
is, a community of shared language, culture or ancestry (e.g. Tamir 1993; Kymlicka 1996; 
Miller 2000). This argument has taken different forms, but all share a deep distrust of 
transnational forms of citizenship. Post-nationalists such as Habermas (1998) have 
challenged this view, arguing that the relationship between nation and demos is contingent 
rather than necessary. Other cosmopolitans have come with principles other than nationality 
to guide political inclusion (e.g. Abizadeh 2008; Baubock 2009; Carens 2013). Abizadeh 
(2008, 2012), for example, criticizes that liberal nationalists and democratic theorists derive 
legitimacy from a pre-political nation in the case of the former, and a pre-political will in the 
case of the latter. Instead, Abizadeh argues, there are “no pre-political grounds for 
constituting the legitimate boundaries of the demos” (2012, p. 868) – thus, the demos must in 
principle be unbounded. Others such as Carens (1983, 2013) defend the primacy of human 
rights and thus criticize the citizen/alien distinction altogether. There should be political 
communities, but these should be open to whomever wants to join them (Carens 1983).   
 
In this thesis, I will explore these different sides of the debate to answer the question of what 
the justification for immigrants’ political inclusion in the demos are, and their implications on 
(a) boundaries (b) and sovereignty. By political inclusion I mean inclusion into the body of 
citizens who enjoy political rights – the rights that ensure their equal political participation in 
public discussion and decision-making of a polity (e.g. voting). The reason why such political 
inclusion is important is because, as Habermas (1998) argues, political and private rights, the 
latter being basic individual freedoms, presuppose each other. The ability to have a say in the 
decisions of the polity where one lives is a way of protecting and participating in the context 
where she exercises her private rights and choses how to live. Political rights in one’s country 
of national origin cannot substitute political rights in one’s home country. A person is an 
ongoing subject to the laws of her home country, and thus this is where she should be able to 
exercise her political autonomy – her right to self-rule. Moreover, there is the issue of 
legitimacy: a state’s decisions that have not been deliberated by all subjected to them cannot 
be deemed legitimate (Habermas 1998; Abizadeh 2008).  
 
Following these two concerns – about political inclusion and the boundaries of such inclusion 
– this thesis is divided as follows. First, I attend to the theories of two very different liberal 
nationalists – Will Kymlicka (1996, 2001) and David Miller (2000) –  and discuss some of 
their shortcomings by contrasting their views with Habermas’ (1998). Secondly, I explore 
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Abizadeh’s principle of democratic legitimacy and the unbounded demos thesis. Abizadeh 
defends that not only immigrants but also foreigners should be included in the decision-
making process because both are coerced by political power (the all-subjected principle). I 
consider whether such a principle is over-inclusive by taking political power, instead of the 
more concrete laws of a polity, as the force that makes individuals “subjects”. In chapter 
three, I explore two last principles of democratic inclusion, which see the demos not just as a 
regime of rule but also as a community of belonging: the stakeholder principle (Baubock 
2009) and the social membership principle (Carens 2013). I ask how these principles and the 
way they bound the demos affect political participation.  
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2. A reply to liberal nationalists 
In response to criticisms of the traditional nation-state model by cosmopolitans, liberal 
nationalists have defended national identities for mainly three reasons: (1) the nation or a 
national consciousness creates favorable conditions for liberal democracy such as trust and 
solidarity (Tamir 1993, Miller 2000); (2) collective self-determination takes place within 
nations; and (3) the nation is the relevant context where individual freedom takes place 
(Kymlicka 1996). In this chapter, I will show the shortcomings of each of these arguments by 
contrasting them with Habermas’ discussion in The Inclusion of the Other (1998). In this 
work, among other topics, Habermas argues that the relationship between democratic politics 
and national identity may be contingent rather than necessary (p. 132). In the context of 
diversity and migration, it may be morally and practically fitting to severe this link (Ibid.).  
David Miller (2000) or Yael Tamir (1995) have argued that attempts to disarticulate 
nationality from political membership fail to grasp the conditions under which liberal 
democracies have been able to flourish. Their arguments run as follows. First, the rise of a 
shared identity or culture, even if the product of nation-building projects by the state, was 
able to bring about favorable conditions for liberal democracy such as trust and solidarity 
(Tamir 1995, p. 72; Miller 2000, p. 88). Second, historically, democratic states developed 
hand in hand with revolutionary understandings of nations as distinct peoples with the right 
to self-determination, that is, to choose their own destiny (see Tamir 1995, pp. 65-67; Miller 
2000, p. 27). This defense of the nation-state is best expressed in Miller’s claim that a 
“national community must be (in aspiration if not yet in fact) a political community” (Miller 
2000, p. 30). This way, nation-states must draw the boundaries of membership, and 
nationality functions both as “a source of identity and as a source of obligation” (Ibid., p. 28).  
 
Nationality as the Source of Social Integration 
Post-nationalists such as Habermas do not refute that national identity has had a historically 
instrumental role. With the rise of secularization, it replaced divine right as the source of 
legitimacy for the state (Habermas 1998, ch.4 section II p. 15). Also, nationality was able to 
create new forms of social integration in the context of pluralism (Ibid., p. 16). Moreover, the 
shift towards popular sovereignty and the rise of civil and human rights, Habermas argues, 
had to be supplemented with a powerful common narrative capable of transforming 
“subjects” into citizens “that feel responsible for one another” (Ibid., p. 19). However, this 
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development is built around a paradox or, as Habermas describes it, is “Janus-faced” (1998, 
ch.4 section III, p. 23), because the exclusivity of national identities is at odds with the 
universalism of an “egalitarian legal community” such as the democratic state (Ibid.).  
 
The self-assertion of the nation has also produced exclusionary policies based on race and 
ethnicity. Such examples include “massive denaturalizations against unwanted minorities” 
(Benhabib 2004, p. 54), or “ethnically selective immigration policies and ethnically closed 
citizenship laws” in the late 19th and early 20th century (Scott 1998, pp. 87-100, cited in 
Joppke 2003, 437). These examples show that despite its historical functions, a naturalistic, 
pre-political, conception of national identity has often produced unjust and undemocratic 
policies. Thus, we cannot limit the discussion to the descriptive question of whether 
nationality enables trust and solidarity among nationals or not (especially when such trust is 
based on ethnic/cultural ties rather than coexistence). Our concern here is normative: in 
which ways does the “Janus-faced” nation preclude democratic ends today?  
 
Nations Have the Right to Self-Determination 
Democratic states today do not engage in race or ethnic-based exclusionary policies, or not 
explicitly. Even if ius sanguinis distributes citizenship according to ethnic ties, there are other 
ways of acquiring political membership. Moreover, this could not be denied to someone 
because of their ethnicity or race. However, democratic states still manage to maintain or 
prolong the political exclusion of immigrants within their territory through different 
mechanisms (e.g. naturalization tests – including civic, cultural and (or) language tests). 
Clearly, tests that ask questions that nationals themselves cannot answer are unfair. However, 
the bigger question is whether states have the ultimate right to impose these tests in the first 
place, or democratic principles limit what can be asked of immigrants (Carens 2013, p. 45).   
 
This brings me to liberal nationalists’ second claim about self-determination. In On 
Nationality (2000), Miller defends states’ right to determine the terms of immigrants’ 
integration on the basis of a nation’s right to self-determination. This entails the nation’s 
capability to dictate matters of political admission and exclusion in order to protect its 
specificity. Such claim has also been advocated by republican theorists such as Walzer 
(1983). Miller argues that “states […] naturally restrict its [citizenship’s] possession to those 
who identify themselves with the nation and are carriers of the right cultural identity [italics 
added]” (Miller 2000, pp. 88-89). Now, because Miller clearly defends the cultural – not 
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ethnic – nation, he also contends that as long as immigrants adopt “the essential elements of 
the national character”, immigration need not pose major problems (Miller 2000, p. 30). 
Indeed, later in his writings, he focuses more on the political character of these elements than 
on their cultural content (Miller 2016, p. 138) – possibly because the distinction between 
politics and culture is not clear in his theory, as he sees the latter as pillar of the former.  
 
However, it is precisely the total merging of politics and national culture in liberal 
nationalists’ narrative that conflates the meaning of democratic self-determination with that 
of the self-determination of the cultural nation. On the one hand, Miller (2000) defends that 
nationality is, in Renan’s (1998) phrase, a “daily plebiscite” – subject to revision by members 
of the community, and thus not incompatible with the changes produced by immigration. On 
the other, he places a strong caveat to the acquisition of political rights that runs afoul of an 
open and inclusive nationality: carrying the “right cultural identity” (2000, pp. 88-89). For 
one, we can ask whether it is possible to arrive at an agreed upon understanding of cultural 
identity. Indeed, many have argued that because the boundaries of the cultural nation are 
obscure, this often descends into the “ethnic nation” (e.g. Benhabib 2000; Joppke 2003; 
Abizadeh 2012, p. 867) – and the use of ius sanguinis proves the point. Still, we may insist 
that there is such a thing as a cultural identity or, as Miller (2000) argues, that this depends on 
members’ belief that there is. However, liberal nationalists argue that it is based on 
“effortless secure belonging”, not on achievement (Margaliz and Raz 1990: 447-9 in 
Kymlicka 1996, p. 89) – which problematizes the logic of naturalization tests altogether.  
 
The problem for liberal nationalists, then, is reconciling their liberalism, expressed in the 
apparent capability of the nation to subject itself to revision, and their nationalism, which is 
built around the idea of historical continuity and the particularism of the nation. Precisely 
because the nation is understood as being a “pervasive” or “all-encompassing” culture, it is 
difficult to see how it can easily be revised from the outside by liberal principles. Such 
revision requires the difficult task that members of the culture adopt a reflexive and critical 
position about what otherwise is their “primary focus of self-identification” (Kymlicka 1996, 
p. 89). For these reasons, Miller’s account of popular sovereignty arguably takes the form of 
– even if unintendedly – what Habermas calls national self-determination. The latter is the 
“right of national independence for the sake of the collective self-realization of a cultural 
form of life” (Habermas 1998, ch.5 p. 46). According to Habermas, national self-
determination must be distinguished from democratic self-determination: 
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 […] It [democratic self-determination] has the inclusive meaning of self-
legislation which involves all citizens equally. It is inclusive in that such a political 
order keeps itself open to the equal protection of those who suffer discrimination 
and to the integration of the marginalized, but without imprisoning them in the 
uniformity of a homogenized ethnic community (Habermas 1998, p. 23) 
 
The difference lies in understanding self-determination as the right of the nation to maintain 
its cultural integrity, or self-determination as the right of citizens to govern themselves. 
According to Habermas, the latter has two implications for immigrants’ integration. First, 
because it is rooted in the principle of self-legislation, when seeking political rights, 
immigrants under a state’s jurisdiction can only be reasonably expected to subscribe to the 
polity’s constitutional principles. This is reasonable because all other citizens must also 
accept them, even if implicitly, by virtue of their legal subjection (Habermas 1998, ch.8 
section V pp 57-65). Second, because of the inclusive character of democratic self-
determination, the state can only promote a political culture whose elements are abstract 
enough for members of very different cultural backgrounds to support them (this must 
exclude fundamentalist or extremist groups, but this is an issue that I will not engage with 
here) (Ibid.). This way, a political culture is expressed through a state’s “constitutional 
principles”, which become a “concrete universal” in the sense that they contextualize 
universal moral principles in particular polities who can interpret them (Habermas 1998, ch.4 
p. 30) 2. “Constitutional patriotism”, as Habermas calls it, can serve the integrative function 
which national identity can no longer fulfill (Ibid.).  
 
National Cultures as the Source of Autonomy 
Habermas’ picture is compelling, but it must answer to another worry by liberal nationalists – 
namely, that national culture is an enabling condition for democracy because it is the source 
of individual autonomy. From this perspective, the view that we can abstract politics from its 
cultural background is unrealistic and unhelpful. Will Kymlicka has put forward this 
argument in Multicultural Citizenship (1995). Here, he presents a more nuanced picture of 
                                                 
2 Habermas distinguishes between ethics and morality – a distinction which must be understood in the context of 
his more general discourse theory. Morality can be understood as the universal principles that all would accept 
in a “reasonable discourse” – according to the discourse principle (D) – whereas ethics are the particular ways in 
which a people(s) interpret those general principles at different points in time (Habermas 1998, p. 8)  
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national identities than Miller’s, as Kymlicka acknowledges the historical achievements of 
nation-building projects, but also criticizes the way in which they have disempowered 
national minorities. Thus, he reformulates the meaning of nation as the context in which 
individuals exercise their autonomy – defined as their capacity to choose and revise their 
ends. Nations enable autonomy by providing individuals a wide range of meaningful choices 
on how to lead their lives. More specifically, Kymlicka defines nations as societal cultures 
(Kymlicka 1996, p. 80) which “possess a set of institutions, operate in a common language, 
and cover both private and public life” (1996, p. 211).  This way, in his account, as in 
Miller’s, collective self-determination takes place in the context of national cultures (2003, p. 
291) – ideally, within national minorities, but Kymlicka admits that it is unrealistic “to grant 
all national minorities their own state” (2001, p. 234).  
 
Parting from this concern about national minorities, Kymlicka defends that group-
differentiated rights should be established to protect their culture and their ability to have a 
say in the policies that affect them. In relation to immigrants, he recognizes that they are also 
in many ways disadvantaged in the political process but does not grant them the status of 
national minorities with the right to self-determination. This is because, so the argument 
goes, immigrants often voluntarily migrate, are willing to integrate into the majority nation 
and are too territorially dispersed (Kymlicka 2002, pp. 352-355). Thus, he distinguishes 
between three types of rights: (1) self-government rights for national minorities (e.g. in the 
form of a federal state); (2) polyethnic rights to protect “certain practices associated with 
particular ethnic or religious groups”, that must nonetheless remain within the constraints of a 
polity’s constitution; and (3) special representation rights to guarantee the political 
participation of underrepresented groups (including immigrants) (1996, p. 7). Thus, in 
addition to protecting individuals’ autonomy, group-differentiated rights should promote 
“relations of equality (non-dominance) between groups” (Kymlicka 2002, pp. 341-342). 
 
Kymlicka is more sensitive to the case of immigrants than Miller is. Kymlicka’s main goal 
seems about preventing that one cultural group (often the majority nation) controls others, so 
that all can retain some degree of independence. Indeed, he defends that immigrants “can 
demand fairer terms of integration” (Kymlicka 2002, p. 354) and the state must in turn 
provide them. This way, the “common institutions” into which immigrants integrate must 
“provide the same degree of respect, recognition, and accommodation of the identities and 
practices of immigrants as they traditionally have of the identities and practices of the 
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majority group” (Kymlicka 2002, p. 355). At first glance, this thin version of national identity 
and national integration – capable of accommodating different cultural and ethnic groups 
(2002, p. 362) – seems not all that different from Habermas’ description of political culture. 
Still, for Kymlicka, accommodating different cultures is not enough – political culture may 
serve to hold groups together within a state but is not adequate to address the claims of 
national cultures themselves. Instead, they must be able to “engage in their own nation-
building projects” so that they can remain a “distinct societal culture” (Kymlicka 2002, p. 
362).  
 
The question is whether there is a tension between, on the one hand, protecting the 
distinctiveness of national cultures and, on the other, ensuring fair terms of integration for 
immigrants, and I argue that there is. In his later work Politics in the Vernacular (2001), 
Kymlicka discusses that national minorities who want to protect their national identity may 
see immigration as a threat, because immigrants tend to integrate into the majority nation and 
do not understand the struggles of the minority (2001, p. 276). Therefore, national cultures 
should have the right to control the density of immigration and its terms. However, he also 
contends that immigration and national minorities clash less today as “both majority and 
minority nations are moving towards a conception of national identity which is post-ethnic 
and multicultural” (Kymlicka 2001, p. 283). This last claim resonates again with Habermas’ 
discussion of a political culture and begets the question of whether in this multicultural 
context it is necessary to protect national cultures (Kymlicka believes that yes, because their 
claims remain unresolved). However, the main issue that I see with this argument is, how can 
we ensure that immigrants and national minorities (or all individuals) hold an equal standing 
when the protection of national minorities or cultures seems of first-order importance? Does 
the protection of national cultures risk the equality of all individuals?  
 
In order to answer this question, I will use Habermas’ discussion of autonomy – which I will 
continue to use throughout this paper. Habermas defends two forms of autonomy: the private 
autonomy of individuals based on basic rights and the public autonomy of citizens based on 
political rights (which enable citizens to be the authors of the laws that govern them). Private 
and public autonomy “mutually presuppose each other” in that in order to be able to lead a 
life of one’s choice, one must also be able to protect the context in which that choice(s) takes 
place through her public autonomy. Simultaneously, a person must be autonomous and 
independent to use their public autonomy (Habermas 1998, ch.8 section IV, p. 12). Thus, 
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contrary to liberal cosmopolitans such as Carens (2013), Habermas does not see human 
rights as an external constraint to but as an enabling condition of popular sovereignty. This 
version of sovereignty denies that polities wield inherent legitimacy. Instead, only when they 
serve as a medium to express the citizens’ wills can they be deemed legitimate. The role of 
the democratic state, or of its law, is thus to protect these two forms of autonomy rather than 
guaranteeing the survival of specific cultural forms: 
 
“Cultural heritages and the forms of life articulated in them normally reproduce 
themselves by convincing those whose personality structures they shape, that is, by 
motivating them to appropriate productively and continue the traditions. The 
constitutional state can make this hermeneutic achievement of the cultural 
reproduction of the life world possible, but it cannot guarantee it. For to guarantee 
survival would necessarily rob the members of the very freedom to say yes or no 
that is necessary if they are to appropriate and preserve their cultural heritage 
[italics added]” (Habermas 1998, ch.8 section IV, p. 42).  
 
Habermas thus defends that the constitutional state can protect the context where cultural 
reproduction takes place by safeguarding the political and private autonomy of its members. 
However, it cannot guarantee the integrity of specific cultural heritages because this would 
instead deprive individuals of the very autonomy that enables them to choose how cultural 
reproduction takes place (e.g. whether they should preserve certain traditions or want to 
abandon them instead). I think that this vision of the relationship between private and public 
autonomy is better able to protect the interests of all – including not just national minorities 
but also immigrants – for the reasons I expound below.  
 
Certainly, for many individuals, national cultures are an important part of their identity, but I 
doubt that it is everyone’s “primary focus of identification” or that “only through having 
access to a societal culture people have access to a range of meaningful options” (Kymlicka 
1998, p. 83). And as I have already discussed, cultural boundaries are difficult to delineate, as 
all cultures are in some way “hybrid” (Abizadeh 2012, p. 871). That is, individuals belong to 
different cultural groups that sometimes overlap. Moreover, national culture may provide an 
individual with meaningful choices, as well as other groups do, but it may also inhibit it. For 
example, a gay person living in a place where homosexuality is not tolerated is not forsaking 
but exercising her autonomy by leaving it. Also, an immigrant who has spent a long time 
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outside her home country may feel neither fully attached to her national culture nor to her 
host country’s culture, but that does not mean that she cannot be autonomous in other ways. 
Not only can she be autonomous, the political regime should protect her private autonomy, 
and also become the medium of expression of her political autonomy.   
 
I want to end this discussion by pointing that Kymlicka is right in that it is difficult to place 
institutions and political processes in a state outside their cultural background. Moreover, it is 
important to reflect on the struggles of national minorities and other ethnic and cultural 
groups. The question at hand is whether protecting specific cultural forms promotes equality 
among groups (and among the individuals in them), or in some ways inhibits it. For example, 
while Kymlicka defends fair terms of integration for immigrants, he also contends that 
national minorities should dictate those terms to protect themselves. However, in practice, 
this goal may require imposing onerous conditions on immigrants’ political inclusion.  
 
Here again there is a genuine tension between national self-determination, or the right to 
national independence, and democratic self-determination, the right of individuals within a 
specific jurisdiction to be authors of the laws that govern them, irrespective of their cultural 
allegiances. In the end, protecting the good of political membership is, I think, of greater 
importance than protecting the good of cultural membership (which should depend on 
individuals’ use of their private autonomy). More so if Abizadeh (2012) is right in that the 
latter might unintendedly descend into protecting ethnicity, simply because demarcating the 
boundaries of culture is a difficult if not impossible task. In sum, the demos cannot be 
bounded by a pre-political nation. 
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3. Abizadeh on democratic legitimacy    
 
Embracing the principle of democratic self-determination that Habermas (1998) defends 
entails that individuals must be the authors of the laws that govern them. Thus, long-term 
immigrants in a state’s jurisdiction should be included in the demos (this would exclude 
transients or tourists). However, there is one question left unanswered: does political 
autonomy presuppose the boundedness of the demos? Indeed, one question that has received 
much attention in recent decades in political theory is how to democratically arrive at the 
demos, what Whelan (1983) first referred to as the democratic boundary problem (see also, 
for example, Dahl 1987; Goodin 2007). The problem is that we cannot arrive at the demos 
through democratic methods, as we would first have to decide who should vote on this issue, 
which leads to the problem of infinite regression. Still, democratic theorists have sought for 
other principles to assess the democratic legitimacy of political community and their 
boundaries. If legitimacy does not derive from a pre-political nation we must find it 
elsewhere. In this chapter, I will explore Abizadeh’s (2008, 2012) vision of democratic 
legitimacy (based on equality and participation), and contrast it with Habermas’ popular 
sovereignty, introduced in the last chapter, to analyze their respective implications for (a) 
boundaries and (b) political participation.  
 
In two recent works, Abizadeh (2008, 2012) challenges the bounded demos thesis because it 
runs afoul of democracy’s constitutive principle of self-rule. The problem is what Abizadeh 
calls the “self-referential theory of political legitimacy” (2012, p. 867): both cultural 
nationalism and democratic theory derive legitimacy by appealing to a pre-political people 
(Ibid.). Cultural nationalism does so by accepting the legitimacy of a pre-political nation, and 
democratic theory by accepting the legitimacy of the demos without justifying its formation 
first, or by relying on the hypothetical social contract. However, the formation of civic 
boundaries is an exercise of political power that inevitably creates members and non-
members. This begets an “externality problem” because the will of these non-members has 
not been accounted for in the creation of differentiated jurisdictions – despite the fact that 
they are politically coerced when the member/non-member distinction is created. Thus, a 
bounded demos cannot be democratically justified to exist prior to its political constitution. 
The demos must in principle be unbounded (2008, p. 47; 2012, pp. 876-877). 
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Abizadeh skillfully rejects the bounded demos thesis outside the liberal cosmopolitan debate 
on human rights (e.g. Carens 2013) and within democratic theory. Despite the democratic 
boundary problem, he contends that democratic theory has the tools to inquire into how to 
legitimize the exercise of de facto political power (Abizadeh 2012, pp. 879-880). This is how 
he develops the all-subjected principle, which can be summarized as follows:  
 
P.1. All states involve some form of coercion, in the form of: 
Coercive acts: “directly and preemptively deprive persons of some options that 
she would otherwise have had” (p. 40) 
Coercive threats: threats of undertaking an action that will prevent a person from 
choosing one course of action that the otherwise might have chosen (40)  
P.2. Coercion imposes restrictions on an individuals’ autonomy3  
P.3. Autonomy should only be forgone, or partly forgone, in exchange for political 
 participation (this is the way in which the state justifies political power).  
 
Therefore, the state must justify its use of coercion to all those over whom it is exercised. And 
because coercion is exercised over members and non-members by virtue of constituting those 
borders and creating this distinction, it should be justified to both (Abizadeh 2008, p. 47). 
Abizadeh thus rejects unilateral state sovereignty thesis which sees “admission and 
exclusion” as the “deepest meaning of self-determination” (2008, p. 44) and replaces it with 
popular sovereignty. (Note that this does not exclude the existence of borders, but only 
insofar as they have been previously justified to nonmembers by allowing them to participate 
in their creation). Two new principles of democratic legitimacy thus come into light: 
 
Participation: All persons subjected to coercion must be able to “actually participate 
in the political processes that determine how power is exercised” (p. 41); 
 
Freedom/equality: The terms of this participation must be consistent with their 
freedom and equality (Ibid.)  
                                                 
3 Abizadeh takes Joseph Raz’s definition of autonomy: that people are able “to control their own destiny”. For 
this, three conditions must be met: “the person (1) has the appropriate mental capacities to formulate personal 
projects and pursue them, (2) enjoys an adequate range of valuable options, and (3) is independent, that is, free 
from subjection to the will of another through coercion or manipulation” (Abizadeh 2008, p. 40).  
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This conceptualization of democratic legitimacy resonates with Habermas’ principle of 
popular sovereignty4. Both are grounded on individuals’ capability of forming their “will” 
through democratic procedures and institutions, instead of on the inherited legitimacy of an 
imagined pre-political will or nation (see Habermas 1998 ch.5 section I, p. 19; Abizadeh 
2008, p. 42). Both seem to defend the same form of deliberative democracy. However, 
Abizadeh is still critical of Habermas because the latter yields to the bounded demos thesis by 
ultimately deriving legitimacy from political deliberation, democratic procedures, and the 
laws that articulates them – that is, without first asking whether the collective whose will is 
articulated through these procedures has been legitimately constituted (Abizadeh 2012, p. 
868). Note, however, that even though Habermas defends the idea of a collective bounded by 
shared constitutional principles (even if the boundaries are the result of arbitrary outcomes) 
the very name of his work The Inclusion of the Other (1998) reflects the openness of such 
community. Indeed, in its preface, Habermas defends the idea of a “we” which has 
“permeable boundaries” and “resist all substantive determination” (Habermas 1998, p. 2).  
 
For Habermas, then, the question of the legitimacy of boundaries remains open (Habermas 
ch.5 section II, p. 24). However, he also assumes that the exercise of democratic political 
power presupposes distinct demoi in order to (a) “institutionally articulate a collective will”; 
and (b) “generate some form of solidarity” (recall Habermas’ constitutional patriotism) 
(Abizadeh 2012, p. 878). Recall also that in Habermas’ theory the state has no inherent 
legitimacy; it is just a structure (not the only) through which universal moralism can be 
realized in the form of a “concrete universal” (he also speaks of the possibilities of a global 
demos). For Abizadeh, however, without the “constitutive features of procedures and 
processes that instantiate democratic self-rule” – including the justification of the medium 
through which this is exercised, or of the boundaries that define its extent – there can be “no 
procedural democratic legitimization at all” (Abizadeh 2012, p. 878). That is, Abizadeh 
argues that we must not confound the conditions under which democratic legitimacy is 
feasible, with the constitutive features of democratic legitimacy itself. Such features must 
include the self-rule of all those not just under the legal obligations of the state but more 
generally politically coerced by it (Ibid.).  
 
                                                 
4 In “On the Demos and Its Kin: Nationalism, Democracy, and the Boundary Problem” (2012), Abizadeh rejects 
the term “popular sovereignty”. He writes: “I agree with Yack (2001) that it [popular sovereignty] invariably 
connotes a prepolitical ground of legitimate authority” (see Abizadeh 2012 footnote 32, p. 880). 
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Clearly, both authors’ theories justify the inclusion of immigrants in the demos, but 
Abizadeh’s all subjection principle includes foreigners outside the state as well. The question 
is whether such extension of political participation is problematic for democratic self-
determination by making the problem of boundaries indeterminate. In other words, there 
might be strong justifications for grounding subjection on something concrete such as a 
polity’s constitutional law (in the Habermasian sense, see footnote 2) rather than on coercive 
political power. Political coercion is too complex and might lead to a “radically inclusive 
principle” (Song 2012), especially in the context of globalization. If our main concern is with 
ensuring equal political participation of all whom share the same legal obligations or are 
willing to share them (and mine is), there might be reasons to concede that boundaries are 
ultimately arbitrary but as long as they serve that purpose there is no compelling reason to 
contest them (Habermas 1998, ch.5 section II, p. 31). Yet this also implies that they must 
remain permeable (Habermas 1998, p. 2).   
 
To explore this worry let us dwell into the implications on political participation in 
Abizadeh’s theory. First, these implications are not completely clear, as he does not describe 
them extensively. However, in the conclusion of “Democratic Theory and Border Coercion: 
No Right to Unilaterally Control Your Own Borders” (2008), Abizadeh argues that different 
degrees of coercion might require different degrees of participation in the democratic 
process. For example, foreigners for whom entry to a state is of little value have the weakest 
rights of participation within that state, while foreigners for whom entry is of great value 
should have greater rights (Abizadeh 2008, pp. 54-55). Yet basing political participation on 
“degrees of coercion” begets three questions: (1) can such differentiated rights actually 
uphold the principle of equality? (2) does Abizadeh truly overcome the problem of infinite 
regress in legitimacy discourses? and (3) if we base political participation on the degree of 
coercion, who can legitimately interpret how coercion affects autonomy? 
 
First, differentiated participatory rights of the kind that the all-subjected principle requires 
involves a shift from a horizontal understanding of equality, where all individuals in the 
demos (even if this is contingent) have equal rights, toward a vertical understanding of it 
contingent on the degree of coercion. Sarah Song (2012) is one among other theorists 
skeptical about such vision. Song argues that the demos should be bounded by the state 
because relying on “episodic, constantly changing demoi” (pp. 56-57) cannot sustain 
constitutive principles of democracy such as stability or political equality. Not only this, but 
 18 
such a system would simply be infeasible. Instead, a “system of public law establishes a 
common view of the rights of individuals, and it has the coercive means to enforce that view” 
(Song 2012, p. 58). While Song’s argument is compelling, it is not necessary to commit to 
the claim that the state is best able to produce political equality to remain skeptical about 
vertical forms of political participation. More so when this is not necessarily tied to legal 
obligations, but to the much more contestable principle of political coercion (what constitutes 
coercion is a whole other debate). The problem is that Abizadeh admittedly does not develop 
a theory of political equality, but this is necessary for the completeness of his argument.   
 
Secondly, the distribution of differentiated rights requires a coercive institution in the first 
place, which is one reason why Abizadeh does not simply dismiss the state. Still, we might 
argue that the border between Spain and France is illegitimate and that members and 
nonmembers should participate in redrawing it. However, we still need an institution to 
establish how participatory rights in such task are to be distributed, and to enforce them. But 
how can it be established whether such institution is legitimate or not? Even if we derive 
differentiated demoi from a global demos (Abizadeh 2008, p. 49, p. 54), surely there would 
be people who end up in a demos that was not of their first order preference, or not even of 
their preference. The problem is that Abizadeh is right in that we must part from the de facto 
exercise of political power to determine participation. Yet if we start by questioning whether 
the boundaries where such exercise takes place are legitimate, we must also ask whether the 
source of power that protects, interprets, and infringes upon autonomy is. But such 
requirement once again leads to the problem of infinite regress, unless we derive 
differentiated demoi from a global demos which as I just argued is unfeasible. The problem of 
infinite regress might simply be unavoidable in legitimacy discourses.  
 
Third, there is the issue of interpreting autonomy and the value of people’s choices. How can 
we be sure that the distribution of differentiated rights will be fair? Or that one option is more 
valuable to person A than to person B? This might be obvious in some cases, but not in all. 
The autonomy principle by itself, for example, supports cases where potential immigrants 
should have greater participatory rights than some residents within a state. Imagine, person A 
living in a poor country where her options are very limited, and person B living in another 
where her options are ampler, yet she is not politically represented. If we take the relationship 
between coercive political power and private autonomy as the biggest determinant for 
participation, then person A should have a right to greater participation so that she can 
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migrate to the country of person B. However, such resolution, I argue, would fail to account 
for the relationship between authorship and subjection. The point is that being subject to the 
same constitutional principles not only creates some sense of solidarity (Habermas 1998), it 
also establishes a clear relationship between legal obligations and “legal authorship” in the 
Habermasian sense, that bounds all equally. Given that Abizadeh does not specify the terms 
of political participation, the all-subjection principle does not equal to but must be 
supplemented with the principle of self-government. This is necessary to ensure that the two 
pillars of his principle of democratic legitimacy (participation and equality) are realized. 
 
Abizadeh makes a strong case for why political power coerces beyond boundaries, in contrast 
to theorists such as Miller (2010)5. This is a powerful justification for the creation of more 
accountable transnational democratic institutions and for moving toward more porous 
borders. Yet this approach is different from expanding participation to all foreigners. Because 
of (a) feasibility concerns, (b) to preserve democratic equality, and (c) the difficulties of 
avoiding the problem of infinite regress in legitimacy discourses, it is reasonable to start the 
legitimization process at procedures themselves. Of course, this entails that how the demos is 
bounded must be open to change whenever the protection of private and public autonomy is 
jeopardized. Thus, the point is that even though boundaries are contingent, that they serve the 
end of democratic self-determination is more important than that their formation is 
legitimized. Participation and equality should still function as principles to assess the 
legitimacy of political communities, but they may be better served if contingent on legal, not 
political, subjection – as the latter ultimately requires the inclusion of members and non-
members, i.e. all. (This would not cancel out transnational forms of membership such as the 
European Union, but it would require that this had a political constitution.) 
 
Indeed, such legal formulation of the all-subjected principle has been proposed by López- 
Guerra. He supports Robert Dahl’s (1989) principle of full inclusion, which establishes that: 
“the demos must include all adult members of the association except transients and persons 
proved to be mentally defective” (Dahl 1989, p. 129). However, he interprets this principle to 
also mean the exclusion of expatriates, because long-term expatriates are no longer subject to 
                                                 
5 In “Why Immigration Controls are Not Coercive: A Reply to Abizadeh” (2010), Miller criticizes Abizadeh’s 
thesis by distinguishing between prevention and actual coercion. He argues that preventing someone from 
entering a border does not undermine their autonomy because she still has a wide range of choices available to 
her. I do not focus here on whether prevention is indeed an instance of coercion or not. Instead, my critique adds 
that taking potential coercion as a principle of inclusion is problematic for an account of democratic equality.  
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a state’s laws6. The principle of full inclusion seeks to prevent what Walzer has called 
“citizen tyranny” (1983, p. 55), in which even within the state the distinction between 
foreigner/citizen prevails – something “no democratic state can tolerate” (Walzer 1983, p. 
61). Note that Abizadeh rejects this legal interpretation of the all-subjection principle because 
he argues that states could deny political rights to individuals by, for example, declaring a 
group in a state’s jurisdiction non-legal persons (Abizadeh 2012, see footnote 25, p. 878).  
 
I think that this is an unfair reading of the legal version of the all-subjected principle. 
Abizadeh seems to think that this equals the unilateral state sovereignty which he rejects in 
his earlier article. Recall that unilateral state sovereignty presumes the independent 
legitimacy of the laws of the state regardless of their moral implications. This vision of state 
sovereignty is not what López-Guerra defends, however. His reading of the all-subjection 
principle relies on the assumption that collectively binding decisions are legitimate only if 
they uphold liberal and democratic principles (López-Guerra 2005, p. 221). In other words, to 
base participation on legal subjection we must first ask whether the institutions and 
procedures in a particular state protect the private and public autonomy (or “political liberty” 
(Ibid.)) of all whom they subject by virtue of their presence in that jurisdiction – which would 
include illegal migrants and guest-workers (Ibid.). 
 
In short, the legal version of the all-subjected principle is that “no person subject to the 
binding decisions of a democratic regime should be denied political rights” (De Guerra 2005, 
p. 221). From this view, the “externality problem” as described by Abizadeh may show the 
ways in which a state acts unjustly (by restricting the autonomy of individuals outside the 
demos). However, according to the legal conception, if the political regime grants all 
individuals within its jurisdiction political rights, it cannot be said to be acting 
undemocratically (López de Guerra 2005, p. 223). That such jurisdiction is a matter of 
accident does not mean that it cannot be legitimate, lest we are indeterminately burdened with 
the problem of boundaries – unless we simply grant that there should be a global demos, but 
such possibility leaves out the question of inclusion altogether.  
 
 
 
                                                 
6 For a defense of why expatriates are subject to the state’s laws, see Owen (2011).  
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4. Joseph Carens and Rainer Bauböck on the logics of belonging 
 
So far, I have attended to the debate between liberal nationalists and post-nationalists 
regarding the integration of immigrants – and answered yes to the question of whether 
immigrants should be integrated in the demos according to the democratic principle of self-
rule. I have also inquired into the debate within democratic theory about what form self-rule 
should take to uphold a principle of democratic legitimacy where this is not grounded on a 
pre-political will or nation. Although Abizadeh sheds light on how political power coerces 
individuals beyond its jurisdiction, I have suggested that (a) it is impossible to justify every 
instance (including past instances, e.g. boundaries) of political power; and (b) the end of self-
democratic self-determination may require instead that democratic and liberal principles are 
realized within bounded communities (not the state per se, nor does this mean that there 
cannot be overlapping or transnational memberships). These boundaries are therefore 
contingent and secondary to the end itself.  
 
However, another set of cosmopolitans have criticized the all-subjected principle for deriving 
legitimacy from the de facto exercise of political authority (Baubock 2009a, pp. 480-481), 
and assuming that the political community is just a “regime of rule” instead of a community 
of belonging (Owen 2011, p. 648). These are fair criticisms and resonate with my earlier 
concern about infinite regression in legitimacy discourses. Moreover, they point to an 
interesting question: should inclusion be based only on political/legal terms, or according to 
something more transcendental such as simply belonging somewhere? Imagine an immigrant 
that moved somewhere at age twenty to work and does not speak the language of her host 
country because she does not need to use it in her workplace or among her friends. Should 
that person be able to have political rights in her country of origin, where, let us suppose, she 
cares more about what happens, or in her host country with which she maintains only an 
instrumental relationship? In this chapter, I shall explore these questions through the lenses of 
Carens (1983, 2013) and Baubock (2009), but ultimately argue that the principle of self-rule 
is better suited to prevent illegitimate exclusion. Moreover, these principles cannot escape the 
arbitrary demos problem (Owen 2011) either.  
 
The Social Membership Principle  
In “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders” (1987), Carens criticizes the citizen and 
alien distinction by appealing to human rights (p. 251). Not that this means that there cannot 
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be political communities, but these cannot restrict migration because of the fundamental 
primacy of individual liberties. After all, citizenship is a reflection of privilege in the sense 
that those who are born in rich societies have much ampler opportunities than those born in 
poor ones (Carens 1987, p. 252). Later in the The Ethics of Immigration (2013), Carens 
discusses how the state should not just be regarded as a coercive body, but also as a home 
that “structures, secures and promotes an individual’s relationships with other human beings, 
including her family” (2013, p. 23). In a way, the state should function as a family. If a 
couple adopted a child, we would not think that they should treat that child differently than 
their natural born children. The same way, when states take individuals in, it is unfair to 
relegate them to a second-class position. Not only is this unfair from a human rights’ stance, 
it also denies a social reality by assuming that everyone’s original nation is their home 
(Carens 2013, p. 102). In short, the social membership principle establishes that individuals 
are entitled to political rights by virtue of belonging to, or having social ties in, a community.  
 
According to this principle, then, if I was born in a country and then moved at age twenty to 
another, I should be able to have political rights in both places because I have social ties in 
both. Thus, the social membership principle can justify membership iure sanguinis and dual 
nationality (Carens 2013, p. 33). This is an interesting point because it acknowledges that 
when some immigrants migrate they are not necessarily interested in acquiring political rights 
(they may feel that they prefer to retain ties in their home country). However, the principle of 
self-rule that I have put forward throughout this paper demands that if immigrants live 
permanently somewhere, they should eventually be able to have political rights there so that 
they are both politically and privately autonomous (the question of the number of years after 
which this should take place, I leave open). We can also expect that if someone is a 
permanent resident in a place, they will eventually learn that place’s language and develop a 
sense of belonging there. If they do not, the problem may be that there are not enough 
avenues for immigrants to integrate in that place. On the other hand, this idea is implicit in 
Carens’ claim that we cannot always assume one’s place of national origin a “home”.  
 
Still, the social membership principle blurs the distinction between political and social 
membership. Surely, children of emigrants would want to maintain ties to their parents’ 
country. But if these children never lived there, then their political inclusion is not justified. 
Indeed, a person might have social ties in state H because she goes on vacation there every 
summer. She has friends and a house and cares deeply about what happens there. Does that 
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justify that she should hold political rights there? Clearly not. In this context, I agree with 
Baubock that the social membership principle begs the question of why “other networks 
across borders, such as business connections, should not also be regarded as forms of societal 
membership” (Baubock 2009, p. 482 in Owen 2011, p. 651). Note that Carens acknowledges 
that “citizenship in one’s parents’ country of origin is not an adequate substitute for 
citizenship in the country where one lives” (Carens 2013, p. 38). Moreover, claims to dual 
nationality inexorably vary from case to case (depending on the child’s social ties to her 
parents’ country) (p. 29). Still, the principle of popular sovereignty that I have been 
defending demands full inclusion within demoi, rather than the projection of national 
citizenship abroad – which is the form that ius sanguinis ultimately takes.  
 
Pointing to the right of belonging is indeed important for further justifying the inclusion of 
immigrants. It may also be helpful in unclear cases: for example, if someone is constantly 
moving from place to place, maybe she should have the right to participate where she feels 
that she belongs – because we expect political membership to grant some degree of stability 
(Song 2012), which she would not have if her political rights depended on constantly 
changing jurisdictions. However, while the fact of migration may be a strong argument for 
the creation of transnational regimes accountable to their subjects, as a guiding principle 
social membership lacks force. First, it does not pay enough attention to the relationship 
between private and public autonomy – as it allows an individual to be a political member 
where she does not live by virtue of having social ties there. Secondly, there is the problem of 
discretion: ultimately, the task of deciding who belongs or not would have to be in the hands 
of political regimes – and we cannot ensure that the results would be just. The principle of 
self-rule (that individuals must be authors of the laws that addresses them) is the more 
concrete way of ensuring that regimes are accountable to their subjects.  
 
The stakeholder principle 
Does Baubock’s stakeholder principle overcome the shortcomings of the social membership 
principle? Yes and no. The stakeholder principle establishes that membership depends on 
whether an individual’s rights depend “on protection by a particular polity” and her well-
being is “tied to the common good of that polity” (Baubock 2005, p. 686). On the one hand, 
as Owen argues, the stakeholder principle appeals directly to political ties (Owen 2011, p. 
650) and, in that sense, is able to set apart political membership from other statuses. On the 
other, the stakeholder principle still allows dual nationality and citizenship iure sanguinis, as 
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individuals might have stakes in their parents’ countries. Thus, while it appeals to political 
ties, it sees these mostly in terms of the state’s function of protecting individuals’ rights. The 
differences between Baubock and Carens’ theories are actually quite thin.  
 
Baubock criticizes the social membership principle because the latter ultimately relies on 
Westphalian sovereignty. That is, it accepts the sovereignty of nation-states, even if it allows 
multiple memberships. Baubock argues that the social membership principle derives “claims 
to political membership from factual societal membership”, but then refers to “given political 
boundaries in order to define societies in the first place” (Baubock 2009, p. 482). But is this 
not also the case with the stakeholder principle? The stakeholder principle ultimately 
specifies that political inclusion is contingent on (1) an individual’s dependency to a 
community for the protection of her basic rights and on (2) whether she is an ongoing subject 
to that community’s political authority (Baubock 2009, p. 479). Therefore, it must also rely 
on existing political communities as it makes inclusion contingent on some of its actual 
functions. Moreover, considerations on the value of stakes must also ultimately depend on 
that political authority.  
 
As with the other transnational principles that I have discussed, the stakeholder principle also 
derives legitimacy from de facto political power. Owen points to an example of this: Baubock 
argues that the democratic state has the right to decide whether expatriates should vote or not 
and the conditions attached to their political inclusion (2007, pp. 2426-2427 in Owen 2011, p. 
658). Thus, Baubock turns to the authority of the state to determine which stakeholders 
should be given national voting rights (Owen 2011, p. 658). Owen describes this as the 
arbitrary demos problem and attempts to solve it by appealing to a non-arbitrary principle, 
arriving at this conclusion: since “constitutional laws that specify the entitlements and 
obligations of citizens” bind all citizens irrespective of residence status, then non-resident 
and resident citizens should be included to decide matters such as expatriate voting (Owen 
2011, p. 659).  
 
Such a principle ultimately allows for different “political entitlements for resident and non-
resident stakeholders” (Ibid.). However, Owen’s answer seems less of a solution than an 
indication that, as I have been arguing throughout this paper, demoi are arbitrary (in addition 
to my concern about different political entitlements developed in the last chapter). If we refer 
to constitutional laws to democratically determine political inclusion yet are concerned with 
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democratic boundary problem as Owen is, we still have to justify why such principles apply 
to citizens (be they residents or not) from country Y and not country Z. That is, why those 
laws bound that specific group of people in the first place. Therefore, we are obliged to return 
to the democratic boundary problem. This is not a problem if we evade the question of 
boundaries altogether and focus on the legitimacy of institutions. However, like the social 
membership principle, the stakeholder principle relies on something nonconcrete and 
discretionary such as stakes to evaluate legitimacy – that does not quite match up to the legal 
version of the all-subjection principle. Moreover, once again, we might question whether 
conceding nationality iure sanguinis is justified. On the other hand, some may argue that as 
long as individuals also have political rights where they live, dual nationality or nationality 
iure sanguinis need not be a problem – and I leave that question open. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
The basic democratic principle of self-rule demands that immigrants are included in the 
demos, irrespective of immigrants’ cultural or national allegiances. Indeed, if we subscribe to 
a principle of democratic self-determination such as that described by Habermas, we can 
conclude that: (1) national identity cannot be the basis for accessing political rights (certainly 
a practice such as ius sanguinis cannot be justified); and (1) immigrants should have access to 
equal political rights so that their public (and private) autonomy is protected. However, the 
question of immigrants’ political inclusion needs to be supplemented with that of where the 
boundaries of the demos lie. 
 
On the one hand, Abizadeh (2008, 2012) rightly points out that both liberal nationalists and, 
very often, democratic theorists derive legitimacy from an imagined pre-political will or 
nation. Instead, both him and Habermas (1998) defend a deliberative conception of 
democracy where individuals arrive at a political will through public discussion and debate. 
Yet for Abizadeh, according to the all-subjection principle, the participants in such 
discussion must include members and non-members, because political regimes coerce both – 
even if in different degrees. However, I have discussed that there are several difficulties with 
this view. Despite feasibility concerns about its practical application, the strongest 
justification for accepting the bounded demos thesis is not that it has independent legitimacy 
but that it enables democratic legitimacy. The principle of nationality is unjustly 
exclusionary, but Abizadeh’s all subjected principle is over-inclusive. Accepting that demoi 
are arbitrary might be a “conceptual defeat”, but accepting such defeat is necessary for 
reorienting efforts toward making actual political regimes accountable to their subjects. Of 
course, this also implies that these regimes should be flexible to fulfil this end.  
 
I explored two other principles to see whether the demos is just a regime of rule, or also a 
community of belonging. Despite their intentions, both the social membership principle 
(Carens 2013), and the stakeholder principle (Baubock 2009) also ultimately derive 
legitimacy from the de facto exercise of political power, which points that the demos is, more 
than anything, a regime of rule. Yet appropriately actualized, it can be the expression of 
political autonomy as well. Once again, the arbitrary demos problem need not be a problem 
in itself – if we contend, as I have, that we can start the “legitimization process” at procedures 
and institutions (and the way these protect public and private autonomy). Instead, the 
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problem with these principles is that they make the relationship between citizens and the 
political regime nonconcrete by appealing to social ties or stakes.  
 
Of course, the question of citizenship in the context of immigration is extremely complex and 
there are many questions left unanswered. I have not discussed here whether there should be 
different principles of inclusion for illegal migrants, immigrants, and guest-workers 
(although, like Carens (2013), I think there should not). Moreover, there might be 
possibilities for establishing Abizadeh’s all-subjection principle, or even a global demos, but 
I think further research needs to be done on their practical implications on political 
participation. I have also left the question of dual nationality open. Nonetheless, I have tried 
to point out why the political exclusion of immigrants within a state is unjust, while arguing 
that is difficult to move beyond the bounded demos thesis. The problem is not that there are 
arbitrary demoi, but how to make them accountable to all individuals subject to their laws. I 
want to end noting that questions of belonging are pervasive, and that normative discourses 
on political membership that move beyond national identity and have a democratic ethos 
should continue to inform realistic approaches to citizenship.  
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